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Abstract
This paper discusses the development of a prototype
alerting system for a conceptual Free Flight
environment. The concept assumes that datalink
between aircraft is available and that conflicts are
primarily resolved on the flight deck. Four alert stages
are generated depending on the likelihood of a conflict.
If the conflict is not resolved by the flight crews, Air
Traffic Control is notified to take over separation
authority. The alerting logic is based on probabilistic
analysis through modeling of aircraft sensor and
trajectory uncertainties. Monte Carlo simulations were
used over a range of encounter situations to determine
conflict probability. The four alert stages were then
defined based on probability of conflict and on the
number of avoidance maneuvers available to the flight
crew. Preliminary results from numerical evaluations
and from a piloted simulator study at NASA Ames
Research Center are summarized.
Introduction
Future air traffic management concepts such as Free
Flight have been proposed to provide a means by which
traffic flow efficiency can be increasedJ Under Free
Flight, current methods of traffic separation through the
use of a rigid airway structure and in-trail spacing would
be relaxed. Consequently, aircraft would have more
flexibility to follow arbitrary routes in response to
changing conditions. To compensate for the loss of
airway structure, automated conflict detection and
resolution tools would be required to aid pilots and/or
ground controllers in ensuring traffic separation.
Because flow efficiency is a driver for Free Flight, it is
desirable that conflicts be resolved using minor course,
speed, or altitude changes well before emergency
avoidance maneuvers are needed. It is also desirable,
given the large number of aircraft in the air, that
conflict alerts are only generated when necessary.
However, the large amount of uncertainty in the Free
Flight environment makes it difficult to determine how
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likely a projected conflict is to occur. The result is a
tradeoff between alerting early to provide a large safety
margin (and also producing unnecessary alerts) vs.
alerting late to reduce unnecessary alerts (but requiring
more aggressive avoidance maneuvers).
Traditionally, alerting systems have been designed
through an iterative, evolutionary process. 24 After
defining alerting thresholds, the performance of the
system (in terms of the protection it provides and the
unnecessary alert rate) is typically evaluated through
simulations of traffic encounters. If collisions or
excessive unnecessary alerts occur, the alerting
thresholds are modified to improve performance; thus,
the performance tradeoffs are generally examined post
hoc.
The tradeoff between safety and unnecessary alerts is
well known in signal detection problems and alerting
systems, s'6 One recent approach to view the tradeoff is
the System Operating Characteristic (SOC) curve. 7 The
SOC curve explicitly shows the expected safety level
and unnecessary alert rate as a function of the alert
threshold setting. The shape of the SOC curve depends
on sensor accuracy, uncertainties in the futurc flight
paths of the aircraft, and human performance. Thus,
changes in sensors or avoidance strategies can be
evaluated by examining their impact on the shape of thc
SOC curve.
This paper presents a novel approach to alerting systcm
design in which the performance tradeoffs are directly
addres_xl in order to select alerting thresholds. SOC
curves are used to aid in threshold placement, reducing
the need for iterative modifications to improve
performance. A prototype alerting system was developed
using Monte Carlo simulations to assess the
probability of a conflict over a range of Free Flight
traffic encounters. The logic was then exercised in a sct
of piloted Free Flight simulation studies at the NASA
Ames Research Center in the Fall of 1996. This study
examined enroute conflicts and acted as a tcstbed for the
alerting logic presented here.
Methodology
The prototype system was developed based on the
concept that initial responsibility for traffic separation
is shifted to the pilot. The alerting system must,
therefore, provide ample warning time so that strategic
maneuvers can be examined and coordination between
flight crews can be carried out.
To simplify its development, the alerting system
described here was designed for one-on-one conflicts
during enroute flight. A more complete, operational
system would have to be additionally evaluated for its
ability to resolve conflicts between more than two
aircraft. In this paper, the aircraft with the alerting
system is refenvd to as the host aircraft; the other
aircraft involved in the conflict is termed the intruder. A
conflict is defined as a situation in which the intruder
enters a Protected Zone around the host aircraft. Based
on current separation standards, the Protected Zone was
defined to be a cylinder 5 nmi in radius and extending
1,000 ft above and below the host aircraft.
A multi-staged threshold approach was used to provide a
series of alerts to indicate trends in conflict hazard. The
multi-stage approach allowed the means of
implementing the alert to be tailored to the level of
threat. Low-probability threats resulted in relatively
passive alerts such as changing the color of a traffic
symbol. High-probability, urgent threats produced aura[
warnings to actively inform the pilots of the conflict.
Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the multi-stage
approach. Three stages (marked 1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 1)
produced changes in traffic display symbology in the
cockpit of the host aircraft. As implemented, the
outermost threshold provided a strategic indication of
potential threat more than 10 minutes into the future. In
the NASA 747-400 simulator, a hollow traffic symbol
on the map display changed color when the first
threshold was exceeded, and the flight crew could begin
to coordinate resolution with the other aircraft. If the
encounter continued, an additional stage informed the
flight crew of the heightening conflict by filling in the
traffic symbol. At the third stage (3), an aural "Alert
Zone Transgression" message was provided to the flight
crew, indicating that they should take action to resolve
the conflict. At this point, there was still ample time to
coordinate resolution with other aircraft. If the conflict
continued without resolution, an Air Traffic Controller
(ATC) took over authority for conflict resolution at the
Authority Transition (AT) zone. The current Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) logic
was not modified and was kept in the simulation as an
independent, final warning system.
_ Authority 1 Wth eeAIrtRes°luti°nmraje_°_
f_ _ _ Trajectory
((_'l__ _ _ 2--_ I =_,_,,houtAlert
_ _ Intruder
__ Aircraft
_-_ _ i Ot_er Aircraft
Fig. I Multi-Stage Alerting Concept
On the host aircraft, the alerting system operates by
obtaining datalinked state information from the intruder.
This information includes both the current state of the
intruder and also an estimate of the future trajectory of
the intruder. Because there are errors in these estimates,
the methodology for developing the alerting system is
based on a probabilistic analysis of the conflict.
Aircraft Trajectory Model
To determine the probability of conflict, a baseline
model of aircraft trajectories was developed. Figure 2
shows a pictorial representation of an aircraft in a Free
Flight environment. The modeled parameters include
uncertainty in the current position estimate, future
along- and cross-track position variability, and the
potential for and magnitude of course changes. Given
these parameters, the aircraft's future trajectory is
represented probabilistically as the dashed region shown
in Fig. 2.
./I.t/\
Fig. 2 Probabilistic Trajectory Model
Figure 3 summarizes the uncertainty parameters used in
the baseline trajectory model. Uncertainty in current
position results from the accuracy of combined Global
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Uncertainty Parameter Modeled Distribution
Lateral Position Error Gaussian _ so m
Host
Aircraft Vertical Position Error Gaussian _ 3o m
&
Speed FluctuationIntruder (Along-Track Variability) Gaussian 15 kts
Aircraft
Cross-Track Variability Gaussian _ 1 nmi
Heading Change
Intruder
Aircraft
Only
Host
Aircraft
Only
Altitude Change
Avoidance Response
Latency
Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation
System (INS) estimates and is modeled as a normally-
distributed random variable with standard deviation of 50
m laterally and 30 m vertically. Course drift in the
future trajectory is modeled as a 15 kt standard deviation
speed fluctuation (along-track error) and a 1 nmi standard
deviation cross-track error. These tracking error values
are based on data obtained empirically from traffic by
Paielli and Erzberger. 8
The host aircraft is assumed to fly a straight trajectory
except for the along- and cross-track variations described
above. The intruder model includes the additional
possibility that the intruder will make a heading change.
The likelihood of a heading change is governed by an
exponential distribution with a mean rate (%) of 4 turns
per hour. This follows from the assumption that
heading changes occur in a Poisson manner. When a
heading change is made, its magnitude is modeled
probabilistically as well. The intruder is equally likely
to make heading changes left or right between 5° and
20 ° , and is less likely to make turns of less than 5° (see
Fig. 3).
Altitude changes are also modeled for the intruder as an
exponential distribution with a mean likelihood of 4
occurrences per hour. When a change in altitude occurs,
the intruder is equally likely to climb or descend to any
altitude within 10,000 ft of its current altitude.
o t (_)
time
o t(hrs)
time
Gamma
-20" -5° O" S° 20"
ma_Initude
I i
0 IO.OOOft
ma_initude
__ mean = 1 rnin.
0 1 Z 3
minutes
Fig. 3 Trajectory Model Parameters
In order to select between alternative conflict resolution
options, it is important to evaluate the reduction in
conflict probability that can be achieved if the host
aircraft maneuvers. Accordingly, a model of host aircraft
resolution maneuvers was also developed. The flight
crew response latency to a conflict alert is modeled as a
probabilistic Gamma distribution with a mean of 1
minute and a variance such that there is a 95%
probability that the response occurs within 2 minutes.
The relatively long latency is intentionally designed to
allow time for coordination with other aircraft and/or
ATC. Thus, avoidance maneuvers are assumed to have a
large time buffer built in. Once initiated, avoidance
maneuvers could include turns, altitude changes, or
speed changes.
It must be noted that the values of the parameters used
in the trajectory model are estimates at this point and
are not expected to be completely representative of Frcc
Flight. Because Free Flight does not currently exist, it
is difficult to predict the probabilistic nature of aircraft
trajectories. However, such a prediction is necessary in
order to estimate the likelihood of conflicts. Even if the
values of the parameters are unknown, the impact of
changes in the parameters can be evaluated to determine
their relative importance. This in turn will help focus
future efforts on improving trajectory estimation.
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Conflict Analysis
The probability of a conflict, P(C), is defined as the
probability that the intruder will enter the host aircraft's
Protected Zone given that no alert is issued and that the
host aircraft maintains its current course and speed. To
calculate P(C), the positions of the two aircraft must be
projected into the future to determine the likelihood of a
Protected Zone violation. However, an explicit
analytical solution incorporating the uncertainty
variables Iisted in Table 1 cannot easily be formulated.
Instead, Monte Carlo simulations are used.
Given the locations, speeds, and headings of the host
and intruder aircraft, the probability of a conflict can be
estimated through Monte Carlo simulation. Each Monte
Carlo run consists of stepping through the trajectories
of both aircraft over time and determining if a conflict
occurs. The trajectories vary randomly with each run
according to the distributions from Fig. 3. For instance,
in one run the intruder might make a 14° course change
1 minute into the flight; in another run, the intruder
may follow a straight-line path for 30 minutes. After a
certain number of Monte Carlo runs, a count of the
number of Protected Zone intrusions was made.
Dividing the number of intrusions by the total number
of Monte Carlo runs is then an estimator of P(C).
P(C) was determined through the separate analyses of
the horizontal- and vertical-plane situations. A conflict
occurs when there are both horizontal and vertical
separation violations:
P(C) = P(Chori_o,ta,) P(Cvertica,) (1)
In the horizontal plane, the Monte Carlo simulations
were performed over a range of state estimates for the
intruder and for several host aircraft avoidance
maneuvers. The result of each set of Monte Carlo runs
is a plot of the probability of a horizontal conflict for
the specific situation (intruder position, heading, speed)
and host aircraft trajectory (straight ahead or
maneuvering). Initial intruder positions were varied over
a grid of dimensions 200 nmi on a side, in 1 nmi
increments. Two intruder velocities were used along
with nine intruder heading angles. Nine different host
aircraft trajectories were examined for each intruder
situation. The nine host aircraft trajectories included:
straight ahead; left and right turns of 10" and 20*; and 10
and 50 kt speed increases and decreases. The resulting
set of probabilities was then stored in a series of look-
up tables indexed by position, heading, and speed.
Figure 4 shows a contour plot of the likelihood of
horizontal conflict for a specific encounter situation in
which the host aircraft is flying at a heading of 360* and
an intruder is currently estimated to be flying at a
heading of 330*. The plot shows actual data based on
10,000 Monte Carlo simulations spaced every 1 nmi. In
Fig. 4, the host aircraft is in white at the lower left.
The plot shows the conflict probabilities for an intruder
aircraft in the surrounding airspace relative to the host
aircraft. For example, an intruder in the position shown
in the figure will cause a horizontal conflict in the
future with probability 0.45. If the intruder were farther
North or East of the host aircraft, this probability would
decrease. As the intruder nears the host aircraft, the
probability of a conflict will increase if the intruder
remains on a collision course. If the intruder changes
heading or speed (or if the host aircraft performs an
avoidance maneuver), a different contour plot would
represent the probability of a conflict.
40
N
30
20
i,o
o
Protected Zone - 5 nrnl radius
I I | I !
0 10 20 30 40 50
Nautical Miles
(intruder: 400 kt, 330 °heading; host aircraft: 400 kt, 360° heading)
Fig. 4 Example Horizontal Conflict
Probability Contours
The vertical conflict probability was obtained by
determining the likelihood that the intruder aircraft
would follow a vertical path that intersected the
Protected Zone. This was performed through an
analytical solution of the vertical probability
parameters. Different potential vertical maneuvers of the
host aircraft were also evaluated by incorporating the
host aircraft's vertical speed into the vertical model.
Alerting Dt;_jgn Tradeoffs
The size of the alert zone affects the performance of the
alerting system. If the alert zone is too large, an
excessive number of unnecessary alerts will be
generated. If the zone is too small, there may not be
enough space or time in which to maneuver to avoid a
conflict. This tradeoff can be examined using two
4
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parameters:theprobabilityofSuccessfulAlert(SA)and
theprobabilityofUnnecessaryAlert(UA).
Whenanalertisissued,it isdefinedto beSuccessfulif
theProtectedZoneisnotviolated.Thus,theprobability
of SuccessfulAlert,P(SA),is theprobabilityof a
conflictwhenan avoidancemaneuveris performed.
P(SA)is thereforeafunctionof timeandthespecific
avoidancemaneuverthat is performedby the host
aircraft:
P(SA)= 1-P(CIavoidancemaneuver) (2)
AnalertisclassifiedasUnnecessaryif thealertwasnot
requiredto avoida ProtectedZoneviolation.The
probabilityof UnnecessaryAlert, P(UA), is the
probabilitythataconflictwouldnothaveoccurredhad
thehostaircraftcontinuedonitscurrentcourse:
P(UA)= I - P(CInoavoidancemaneuver) (3)
To maximizesystemperformance,it is desirableto
maximizeP(SA)andminimizeP(UA).Thesegoals
cannotgenerallybemetsimultaneouslyanda tradeoff
mustbemanaged.
This tradeoffcan be visualizedusing a System
OperatingCharacteristic(SOC)curve.7An exampleis
shownin Figure5. An SOCcurveis aplotof P(SA)
foragivenavoidancemaneuvervs.P(UA).Eachpoint
on the SOCcurverepresentsan alertingthreshold
setting.Forexample,inFig.5,threshold1corresponds
toalargealertzone:alertsaregeneratedarly,resulting
inalargevalueforP(SA)butalsoahighrateof UAs.
Asthealertzonesizeis reduced,thethresholdmoves
alongtheSOCcurvetopoints2and3. Theresultis a
reductioni UAsbutalsoareductioni SAsbecause
lesstime andspaceare availableto performthe
avoidancemaneuver.
Anidealsystemwouldoperatein theupper left comer
where P(UA) is zero and P(SA) is one: ideally, all alerts
are necessary and successful. In reality, SOC curves do
not reach the ideal operating point. Instead, the
threshold must be placed along the curve based on the
tradeoff between UAs and SAs.
The shape of the SOC curve is a function of sensor
accuracy, the type of avoidance maneuver, operator
response latency, and maneuvering aggressiveness. As
sensor accuracy is increased or as response time is
reduced, for example, the SOC curve will move closer
to the ideal operating point.
Ideal
Alertinl.0_stem
_0.8
_0.6
ed,
_'_ 0.4
0.2
1
\
Alerting Threshold Locations
0 I ! M_- I I I I ._
0 0.2 0.4 0,6 0.8 1.0
Probability of Unnecessary Alert
P(UA)
Fig. 5 Example System Operating
Characteristic (SOC) curve
An SOC curve that lies along the diagonal from the
origin [P(SA) = 0, P(UA) = 0] to the upper right comer
[P(SA) = 1, P(UA) = I] represents a system that is
poorly designed. In such a case, an alert is as likely to
be Successful as Unnecessary. This means that alerting
is just as likely to produce a conflict as not alerting.
Thus, the more that the SOC curve moves away from
the diagonal, the better the alerting decision.
Because P(SA) depends directly on the choice of
avoidance maneuver, a different SOC curve can be
constructed for each maneuver option. The most
effective avoidance options can then be identified based
on the shape of their SOC curves.
Prototype Alerting Logic
As described previously, the prototype system uses four
alert stages. The first three stages produce alerts in the
cockpit that are intended to aid the flight crew in
resolving the conflict before tactical maneuvering is
required. At the fourth stage, ATC is notified to issue
commands to provide traffic separation. To set the
conditions at which these stages are triggered, it is
necessary to examine the tradeoffs between P(UA) and
P(SA). This requires balancing the likelihood of a
conflict against the ability of the host aircraft to avoid a
conflict. To do so, five standard conflict resolution
maneuvers were considered:
1) Left Heading Change of 30 °
2) Right Heading Change of 30 °
3) Climb or Descent of 2000 ft/min
5
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4) Speed Increase of 50 kts
5) Speed Decrease of 50 kts
These maneuvers serve as benchmarks for estimating
the ability of the host aircraft to avoid a conflict. When
the intruder is far from the host aircraft, any of these
five maneuvers could be used to resolve the conflict. As
the intruder nears the host aircraft, some of these
maneuvers may no longer provide the required
separation between aircraft. The premise behind the
alerting logic is that if a sufficient number of these
maneuvers are still available to the pilot, the alert can
be delayed. When the pilot's options begin to disappear,
an alert should be issued.
A maneuver was defined to be available to the host
aircraft if, by performing the maneuver, the probability
of a conflict was reduced to less than 0.05 [i.e., P(SA)
> 0.95]. The five maneuver options listed above
included the probabilistic response time described earlier
(with a mean latency of I minute). Thus, when a
maneuver was deemed to be not available, safe
separation could still be achieved if the pilot reacted
more quickly or more aggressively than assumed in the
model.
In real time, the logic calculated the number of
avoidance maneuvers available, N, to resolve a conflict
with the intruder. This was done using the probability
contour data Stored in look-up tables for each of the five
avoidance maneuvers. By comparing N with P(UA), the
appropriate alert stage was defined as shown in Table 1.
The leftmost column of Table ! shows the probability
of a conflict if the host aircraft continues along its
current trajectory. This assumes that the intruder's
trajectory can be represented by the model discussed
earlier. The rightmost column shows P(UA), which as
discussed earlier is related to P(C) by Equation (3). The
other columns indicate the defined alert stages as a
function of N,. Generally, the more options available to
P(C I no maneuver)
0.0 - 0.1
0.1 - 0.2
0.2 - 0.3
0.3 - 0.4
0.4 - 0.5
0.5 - 0.6
0.6 - O.7
0.7 - 0.8
0.8 - 0.9
0.9- 1.0
the pilot, the lower the alert stage.
For example, if P(UA) is 0.35 and there are two
avoidance maneuvers available, then the alert stage is 2.
If P(UA) drops below 0.3 or if N is reduced to I, then
the alert stage increases to 3. If P(UA) drops below 0.1,
then the AT stage is triggered.
Note that because the probability of conflict along
different avoidance maneuvers can be estimated, the
alerting logic can also be used to determine the
magnitude of maneuvering required to resolve a conflict.
By interpolating P(SA) between different maneuvering
magnitudes, the required action to resolve a conflict
with 95% confidence can be determined. For example, if
P(SA) for a 10° right turn is 0.93 and P(SA) for a 20 °
right turn is 0.97, then a 15° turn will result in P(SA)
of approximately 0.95. Thus, the probability data can
be used both to determine P(SA) when a maneuver is
specified, or to determine the magnitude of maneuvering
that is required to achieve a specified value of P(SA).
To better understand the underlying design process, the
thresholds from Table i can be mapped into SOC
curves. Figure 6 shows SOC curves for two coaltitude
aircraft on a collision course along flight paths at right
angles to one another. SOC curves corresponding to
each of the five resolution maneuver options are shown
in the figure.
When the intruder is far from the host aircraft, the
situation maps into the upper right corner of the plot: it
is likely that a conflict will not actually occur [P(UA) =
1] and it is likely that any avoidance action would
resolve the situation [P(SA) for each of the five
avoidance maneuvers is 1]. Data for Fig. 6 were not
obtained beyond 200 nmi, so the SOC curves in the
figure do not extend all the way to the upper right
comer.
As the intruder continues on a collision course, it
becomes more clear that a conflict will occur: P(UA)
Table 1 Alert Level Classification
Number of Avoidance Maneuvers
None One
1 1
1 1
2 1
2 2
3 2
3 3
AT 3
AT 3
AT AT
Available, N
Two
1
1
2
2
3
3
AT
Three or More
1
1
2
2
3
AT
P(UA)
0.9- 1.0
0.8 - 0.9
0.7 - 0.8
0.6 - 0.7
0.5 - 0.6
0.4 - 0.5
0.3 - 0.4
0.2 - 0.3
0.1 - 0.2
0.0 - 0.1
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decreasesandthesituationmovesfromright to left
alongthecurves.Thus,P(UA)isrelatedto thedistance
betweenaircraftandto thetimebeforeclosestpointof
approach.AsP(UA)decreases,P(SA)alsodecreasesin
differingamountsaccordingtothedifferentSOCcurves.
Theeffectivenessof agivenmaneuverdependsonhow
slowlyits P(SA)decreases.Whenacurve'svalueof
P(SA)dropsbelow0.95,thecorrespondingavoidance
maneuverisnolongeravailable.Thus,asthesituation
progressestotheleftinFigure6,thedifferentavoidance
maneuversbecomeunavailablein orderfrom speed
changestoturnsandfinallyto climbordescent.Thus,
the SOCcurvesshowthat for this case,vertical
maneuversarethemosteffective.
Thefirstmaneuverstobecomeunavailablearethespeed
changemaneuvers,atP(UA)ofapproximately0.9.This
is becauselargespeedchangesaregenerallyrequiredto
resolveconflictsinthetimescalesunderconsideration.
UntilP(UA)dropsbelowapproximately0.25,turnsand
climb/descentavoidancemaneuverswillstillprovidethe
requiredseparation.At approximatelyP(UA)= 0.25,
however,a 30° left turnmaneuveris no longeran
option. At approximately P(UA) = 0.2, the 30 ° right
turn is also no longer an option. When P(UA) reaches
approximately 0. I, the climb/descend options become
unavailable.
At a given value of P(UA), N corresponds to the
AlertStage
AT 3 2 1
1.0
0.95
0.9
climb/descend
0.8 2000ftlmin
left 30°
slower50kts
faster50kts
0.0 0.I 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
P(UA)
Fig. 6 SOC Curve:
Aircraft on Perpendicular Tracks
0.9 1.0
number of SOC curves that have values above P(SA) =
0.95. Fig. 6 also shows when the four alert stages arc
triggered as a function of P(UA). Cross-referencing with
Tablc 1, stage 1 is triggered when N is three or more
and P(UA) drops to 0.6. Stage 2 is triggered when
P(UA) drops to 0.4 and Stage 3 is triggered when N
drops to two. Finally, the AT stage is triggered when N
drops to zero. Although Figure 6 shows SOC curves for
a direct collision between two aircraft on perpendicular
flight paths, other geometries produce similar patterns.
The five avoidance maneuvers used here are intended to
represent strategic maneuver limits. It should be
reiterated that a large response time (mean = I rain.) is
modeled in the avoidance maneuvers (see Fig. 3) ,and
that when N is zero, the host aircraft can still maneuver
out of the conflict. A more aggressive, tactical
maneuver such as a 45 ° heading turn or a combined
climbing turn may still be available when thc five
assumed strategic maneuvers are not.
Further examination of the SOC curves show that speed
changes make only a limited contribution to the
prototype logic. In many cases, a speed change of
greater than 50 kts is required for adequate separation
with 95% confidence. As can be seen from Fig. 6, the
SOC curves for the speed maneuvers deviate only
slightly from the diagonal. Thus, it is difficult to
provide successful, necessary alerts with speed control
alone. Similar difficulties with relying on speed control
are mentioned by Krozel, et el. using a much different
conflict analysis method based on optimal control
theory .9
Evaluation
The calculation of the probability of conflict is timc
consuming due to the large number of required Monte
Carlo simulations. Accordingly, the probability
contours were stored in look-up tables to be accessed in
real time. In operation, the system takes aircraft statc
data and compares their values against the look-up
tables to determine the appropriate alert stage using
Table I. When state values varied between the indices of
the look-up tables, the values were linearly interpolated
to estimate the probability of conflict.
The alerting logic was evaluated using numerical
encounter simulations at MIT and also in a human-in-
the-loop simulation study at NASA Ames Research
Center. These evaluations were not exhaustive but were
used to explore several research issues.
As examples, Figures 7 and 8 show the observed times
at which the alert stages were triggered for two different
encounter scenarios. Fig. 7 shows the same situation
7
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describedbytheSOCcurvesinFig.6:twoaircrafton a
collision course on perpendicular trajectories. Alert
stage 1 is triggered 12.3 minutes prior to the time of
Closest Point of Approach (CPA). Stages 2 and 3 are
triggered at approximately 8.5 and 5.8 minutes to CPA,
respectively. ATC is notified to take over authority (at
the AT stage) at 3.3 minutes to CPA. Finally, TCAS
produces a Traffic Advisory (TA) at approximately 45
seconds and a Resolution Advisory (RA) at 35 seconds
to CPA.
--_ 1 .[ 2
12.3 min. 8.5
÷
Direct Collision
CPA
TCAS RA "h
TCAS TA -_tt
5.8 3.3 0.80.6 rain.
Time to Closest Point of Approach (CPA)
Fig. 7 Alert Time Line: Direct Collision
(90 ° Crossing Angle)
CPA
TCAS TA
I I IZ-
6.5 min. 2.2 0.5 +0.5 rain.
0.2
00
Time to Closest Point of Approach (CPA)
Fig. 8 Alert Time Line: 6 nmi Minimum
Separation (90 ° Crossing Angle)
Figure 8 shows a case in which the two aircraft are not
on a direct collision course, but will pass within 6 nmi
of one another. Stage 1 is triggered 6.5 minutes before
CPA, and stage 2 is triggered 22 minutes before CPA.
A TCAS TA is also generated at approximately 30
seconds before CPA. When the traffic passes the host
aircraft, the alert stages gradually decrease. Thus, the
logic increases the alert stage as the potential for a
conflict rises, and reduces the alert stage as it becomes
less likely that the intruder could turn and cause a
conflict.
At the NASA Ames Research Center, the prototype
alerting logic was incorporated in a 747-400 simulator
as part of a study of pilot decision-making aids for Free
Flight. In this study, enroute conflicts were scripted to
examine pilot response and to exercise the alerting
logic.
In operation, the alerting logic was used to trigger the
four stages of alerts discussed previously. Additionally,
the probability data were used to determine the
magnitude of maneuvering required to resolve conflicts
at a specified level of confidence. The pilots in the study
were given an interactive tool to explore different
maneuvering options. These maneuvers were compared
against the probability data to determine if the conflict
would be resolved with 95% confidence. The cockpit
display then indicated to the pilot whether the proposed
maneuver was likely to be successful.
Preliminary results from the NASA study show that the
pilots successfully resolved conflicts without ATC
guidance in most cases. AT alert stages were only
observed in scenarios where the intruding aircraft was
purposely diverted toward the host aircraft at close
proximity. However, a more complete analysis is
required to more fully evaluate the alerting logic and to
determine the potential impact of airborne conflict
resolution on air traffic management.
Conclusion
A prototype conflict alerting system for a Free Flight
concept was developed. The system was designed by
directly accounting for the probability of a conflict in
the alerting logic. A probabilistic model of aircraft
trajectories under Free Flight was used in a series of
Monte Carlo simulations to obtain probability of
conflict contours over a range of traffic encounter
situations. Based on these probabilities, alerting
thresholds were developed. The alerting system was then
implemented in a Free Flight simulation study at
NASA Ames Research Center in September, 1996.
The approach taken in developing the alerting logic
involved determining the probability of a conflict for
several potential avoidance maneuvers. This allowed
alerting thresholds to be based on safety rather than an
indirect metric such as time to closest point of
approach. Additionally, the approach allowed the user to
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determinetherequiredmagnitudeof maneuveringto
resolveaconflictwithacertainconfidence.
A majorlimitationof theapproachusedto developthe
alertinglogic is that a significantamountof
preprocessingwasrequiredbeforethealertingthresholds
couldbedefined.Oncethethresholdsareselected,they
onlyapplyto thespecificprobabilisticmodelusedin
theMonteCarloruns.If a changein themodelis
required(e.g.,to examinetheeffectof varyingsensor
accuracy),thentheMonteCarlosimulationsmustbe
rerunusinganewmodelin orderto updatethealerting
thresholds.A moreflexibleor real-timemeansof
incorporatingthe probabilityof conflict into the
alertingthresholdswouldbevaluablein improvingthe
designprocess.
Look-uptableswerechosento codifythe alerting
thresholdsfor this systembecauseof their relative
simplicity.However,it maybemoreeffectiveto use
neuralnetworksto maptheencountersituationdirectly
to thealertingthresholdswithouttheuseof look-up
tables.Neuralnetscanbetrainedoff-lineusingthepre-
calculateddatafromtheMonteCarlo simulations. Once
trained, a neural net would represent the alerting
thresholds in the real-time system.
Another consideration involves the scope of the
conflict. The resolution maneuvers used to develop the
alerting logic are based on the immediate problem of
avoiding a conflict and do not consider the additional
maneuvering required to return to the original flight
path. Thus, the logic does not incorporate issues such
as increased fuel burn or flight time in the decision to
alert. Because the proposed benefits of Free Flight
revolve around efficient traffic flow, it will be necessary
to incorporate cost-based considerations into the logic in
the future. This can be achieved, for example, by
weighing avoidance maneuver options by the additional
cost or deviation each option would incur.
Finally, centralized traffic management issues have been
ignored. Because, as assumed in this Free Flight
concept, pilots have initial responsibility for traffic
separation, ground controllers could have difficulty
when suddenly presented with a conflict that was not
resolved by the flight crews. Additional conflict
detection and resolution aids must be provided for
ground controllers to enable them to return to the traffic
management loop and manage traffic once they are
alerted to a conflict.
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